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I.

INTRODUCTION

Official punishments, such as fines and prison, are not the only
ramifications of criminal justice involvement. 1 Instead, criminal
conviction, or even criminal arrest, can lead to a stunning array of
broader repercussions, including barriers to employment and occupational licensing; barriers to housing, both subsidized and wholly
private; barriers to financial aid for higher education and other public
benefits; disenfranchisement; barriers to owning firearms or obtaining a driver’s license; exclusion from jury service; and deportation.2
These burdens, which continue indefinitely, collectively are referred
to as “collateral consequences” of criminal justice involvement.3
While the moral, philosophical, and practical implications of collateral consequences were largely ignored for the greater part of
U.S. history, they have begun receiving attention over the past
decade.4 This attention is well deserved, as the overall effect of col*Associate Professor, Justice Studies at Montclair State University in New
Jersey. Received J.D. from New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. from
New York University’s Institute for Law and Society. Dr. Laguardia has served as a
Contributing Editor for the Criminal Law Bulletin since 2019, writing the “From the
Legal Literature” feature for each issue since volume fifty-six, issue number six.
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Colleen Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, 119
MICH. L. REV. 519, 524 (2020).
2

U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF PUNISHMENT,
REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 1–2 (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA8H-92CZ].
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Gabriel Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy
and Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 234 (2018–19); see also, e.g.,
Emily Ahdieh, The Deportation Trigger: Collateral Consequences and the
Constitutional Right to A Trial by Jury, 30 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 65 (2019); Jamie
Connolly, Prosecutorial Discretion and Collateral Consequences: Rethinking the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, 43 J. LEGAL PROF. 269 (2019); Zachary
Hoskins, Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 12 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 625 (2018); Eisha Jain, The Mark of Policing: Race and Criminal Records,
73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 162 (2021); Francesca Laguardia, From the Legal Literature:
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lateral consequences on American society is severe, rising to a level
some scholars rank as equivalent to “civil death”—an almost
complete removal from citizenship and the protection of law.5 It is
also exceptionally widespread.6 One in three U.S. adults have
criminal records, and 5.2 million U.S. citizens cannot vote due to
felony disenfranchisement.7 Like other consequences of interaction
with the criminal justice system, these burdens are disproportionately
carried by people of color, especially Blacks and Latinos.8
As collateral consequences have received more attention they
have become a particular focus of criminal justice reform efforts.9
These efforts have had apparent success, as every state in the
country and the federal government have passed legislative reforms
to address collateral consequences of conviction.10 But while these
reforms have attempted to fix the problem, they are inadequately
implemented, leaving millions of people (“30–40 percent of those
with criminal records”) to remain burdened even though they qualify
for relief.11
In America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, Colleen
Chien explores how these reforms have stumbled in their execution.12
Due to insufficient education of potential applicants, inconsistent and
unworkable standards, complex processes, structural problems such
as high costs of application, and other problems, very few of those
people who qualify for relief under these reforms have managed to
Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1031 (2020); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Rafi Reznik,
Retributive Abolitionism 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 123 (2019); Jenny Roberts, The
Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670
(2008).
5

Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012).
6

Chien, supra note 1, at 529–30.

7

Chien, supra note 1, at 529–530.

8

Chien, supra note 1, at 530.
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See, e.g., Lynne Adelman, Criminal Justice Reform: The Present Moment,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 181 (2015); Chin, supra note 4; Michael Pinard, Reflections and
Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213 (2010).
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obtain it.13 Chien explains the problems that have undermined these
reforms, and suggests how they could be fixed.14
II. COLLEEN CHIEN, AMERICA’S PAPER PRISONS: THE SECOND CHANCE GAP,
119 MICH. L. REV. 519 (2020).
After reviewing the extent of the imposition created by collateral
consequences, Chien offers an introduction to the state of secondchance reforms across the country.15 These include increased opportunities to qualify for early release, reclassifying and downgrading
nonviolent crimes, increasing opportunities to expunge and seal
criminal records, expanded voter eligibility, and federal initiatives offering resentencing opportunities for federal inmates.16 Overall, these
reforms appear to have contributed to “an 11 percent decrease in
state imprisonment rates without an increase in crime rates” generally across the country.17
Chien points out these reforms do not only benefit potentially
incarcerated individuals, or even their families; they also reduce
spending for states by cutting down on the cost of incarceration.18
Costs of incarceration vary but recent estimations suggest federal
incarceration costs close to $40,000 per year, and state costs can
range “from less than $15,000 per Alabama prisoner, on average, to
close to $65,000 per California prisoner, yearly.”19 These costs are
even greater for elderly inmates, who require increased medical
assistance.20 This translates into savings of hundreds of thousands
of dollars per inmate when inmates are released early, as reform
initiatives can reduce sentences by five to ten years or more.21
While the cost savings are clear, other benefits and risks of the
reforms are undetermined. Second chance reforms might enhance
public safety, by increasing successful reentry and rehabilitation, or
decrease public safety by undermining deterrence or reducing the
incapacitative effect of incarceration.22 Additionally, second chance
reforms might offer economic and civic benefits to the broader community, by increasing employment post-incarceration and bringing
13

Chien, supra note 1, at 519.

14

Chien, supra note 1, at 567–89.

15

Chien, supra note 1, at 531–34.

16

Chien, supra note 1, at 531–32.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 534.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 535.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 535.

20
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Chien, supra note 1, at 536–39.
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voters back into civic participation.23 Thus far, Chien summarizes,
there is no clear sign of decreased public safety as a result of second
chance opportunities.24 There is some evidence of increased employment, although these data come from small studies.25 Evidence of
increased civic participation (such as voting) is limited; it is
hypothesized that this is due to a lack of publicity or understanding
about the opportunity to have voting rights restored.26 In all, although
the record regarding these benefits is uncertain, they lean towards
suggesting that the reforms help rather than harm public interests.27
One reason that evidence of the overall effect of second chance
reforms is limited is underutilization of these reforms, and it is to this
issue that Chien turns next.28 This underutilization of second chance
reforms is what Chien refers to as “the second chance gap”—“the
difference between the apparent eligibility and delivery of a particular
second chance in accordance with the law.”29 In other words, it is the
number of people who are legally eligible for relief under second
chance legislation, but for one reason or another do not get that
relief.30 There are many reasons that individuals may miss these opportunities, from a lack of education, to vague standards and
reluctant judges, to structural barriers such as a lack of funds to
pursue expensive administrative processes, or debt accumulated in
connection with the criminal justice process (such as fines and court
fees). 31 Overall, as Chien shows, second chance reforms are
underutilized to a shocking degree.32
In order to estimate just how utilized or underutilized these reforms
are, Chien looks to already existing expert data, as well as performing her own original research.33 Many states and the federal government have already performed research in this area, estimating the
number of individuals who should qualify for relief under second
chance reforms and stating how many have actually obtained that
23

Chien, supra note 1, at 538.

24

Chien, supra note 1, at 538.

25

Chien, supra note 1, at 538–39.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 539.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 538–39.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 539.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 539.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 539, 541–42.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 539–40.

32

Chien, supra note 1, at 545–61.

33
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relief, and it is this expert data that Chien relies on for her analysis.34
In the area of conviction expungement data and employability, Chien
supplements this expert data with original research based on data
provided by background check services (which are often used by
potential employers).35
The numbers Chien presents are astounding. She begins with a
summary of the analysis of the 2014 Clemency Initiative, performed
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which shows that only fifty-four
to ninety-two of 2,687 offenders eligible for relief, a total of only 3%
to 5%, have actually received relief.36 Worse, of the approximately
50,000 elderly inmates in the federal criminal justice system who
might be entitled to “compassionate release” that year, only 296 applied, and only two were released.37 In California, legislation passed
recently to allow certain offenders to reclassify felony convictions for
low level, nonviolent crimes such as shoplifting, as misdemeanors,
and to have their sentences reduced.38 This legislation potentially
applies to two million Californians, according to data provided by the
Los Angeles Public Defender’s Prop 47 Task Force.39 Yet, across
two separate reform statutes applying at least to hundreds of
thousands if not millions of Californians, only 3% to 9% of eligible
persons applied for relief.40 Similarly, of the twelve states that require
an application in order to restore voting rights to persons formerly
incarcerated for felonies, only four have restored voting rights to
more than 10% of eligible persons.41 Of those four, only Iowa has
restored voting rights to a majority of eligible persons (83%).42 Among
the other eight, three have not restored voting rights to any eligible
persons, and the rest have restored voting rights to between one
and six percent.43
From release and sentence reductions, Chien moves on to the
question of mass criminalization, and the long term repercussions of
conviction and even arrest records.44 Chien points out that some of
the most well-known collateral consequences associated with
criminal convictions, the hurdles a record creates for obtaining
34

Chien, supra note 1, at 544.

35

Chien, supra note 1, at 544.

36
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employment, as well as immigration and housing hurdles, may all be
implicated by records of very low level criminal activity, and even
without conviction.45 Because arrest records may be broadly available to background check companies, and because these companies
are widely relied upon, arrest records alone may lead to these same
consequences.46
While most states offer opportunities to expunge criminal records,
once again the gaps in utilization of these opportunities are huge.47
Most states appear to have successfully expunged fewer than 10%
of eligible records, accounting for millions of people living in the
expungement gap.48 In fact, even in Rhode Island, Iowa, and Oregon,
which have the smallest gaps, only 25 to 30% of records have been
expunged, leaving over 300,000 eligible people in the gap in each
state. The gaps in New York (99%) and Washington (97%) account
for more than a million people in each state, and, as noted before,
the gap in California (92–95%) encompasses over two million
people.49
The above numbers refer to convictions, which create records,
and Chien obtained them in reliance on court records.50 However,
arrest records in situations that did not lead to a conviction can be
more difficult to research and more difficult to expunge.51 In order to
create an estimate of the number of individuals who could have their
non-conviction criminal records expunged but have not, Chien
worked with a background check company to create a dataset of
60,000 job seekers and their criminal histories.52 She then analyzed
these records in relation to the laws of the individuals’ states in order
to determine whether those records should be clearable.53 The
results varied widely, in part because states have widely varying
statutes as to records clearance; a state might have a very small
gap in records clearance either because it is very generous and active in clearing records or because its laws are extremely rigid so
that very few individuals qualify to have their records cleared.54
Nationwide, Chien found a total gap of 35%, or 28 million individuals
45

Chien, supra note 1, at 553.
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who legally could have their non-conviction criminal records cleared,
but had not done so.55
Why are so few qualified individuals successfully taking advantage
of these legislative reforms? Chien offers several contributing factors.
One factor is the vagueness of statutes and breadth of discretion offered to decisionmakers under some statutes.56 Decentralized staff,
such as in the case of the Clemency Initiative, or a lack of guidance
and reliance on individual counties to institute their own policies can
create not only an inconsistent application, but an inefficient one, as
applicants are uncertain about the proper path to success.57 Another
factor is the difficulty of verifying eligibility.58 Questions such as
whether someone has reoffended in any way require a way to check
that person’s record across the state.59 Only eighteen states are
capable of this, as it requires using a state identification number
consistently.60 And of course, the cost of pursuing second-chance
opportunities creates another barrier to full implementation.61 Chien
cites research suggesting that the cost of preparing an application
can be thousands of dollars.62 Applicants may also have accumulated
debt over the course of their cases, including court fees, fines, and
restitution, and many statutes foreclose second-chance opportunities to applicants until those debts are paid.63 These costs can be
insurmountable to many potential applicants, and can exacerbate
disparities in the criminal justice system in direct contradiction of the
purposes of second-chance legislation.64
Chien offers several solutions to these problems. The most obvious answer to the financial burdens of court costs and application
costs is to waive those fees.65 But to resolve the problem of the
costs of the application itself, Chien recommends automation.66
Automating the process of clearing records can lower costs through
55

Chien, supra note 1, at 562.

56

Chien, supra note 1, at 572.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 572.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 567.
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61
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62
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scaling, arguably from over $3,000 to under $3.67 Moreover, total
automation of the process (automatic expungement or automatic
voting restoration) avoids relying on any action from courts, which
should reduce the inconsistencies associated with discretion and
court evaluations.68
To further reduce problems of vagueness and inconsistent application, Chien recommends a strategy of “ruthless iteration.”69 It
should be expected, she argues, that statutes will have to be written
and rewritten, with the specific input of those individuals most likely
to be involved in implementing the statutes.70 Only repeated efforts
to simplify and clarify the criteria to qualify for second-chance relief
can offer a path to successful implementation of what often begins
as highly complex legislation.71
But one of Chien’s most important insights may be the particular
problems caused by the combination of the permanence of the
internet, and the catch-22 of trying to expunge a record that did not
end in a conviction.72 It is a popular joke about modern everyday life
that “the internet never forgets,”73 but Chien shows that the results of
this permanence can nullify the best efforts of legislators. 74
Background check and “people search” organizations seize crimerelated data from early in the criminal process (such as mug shot
photos, and arrest records), make that information available to the
public, and are unlikely to erase that data if charges are dropped.75
The use of non-conviction and non-acquittal resolutions to charges,
such as no-contest pleas or dismissal for failure to pursue a conviction, may be recorded in legalese (or Latin) that most non-lawyer
readers do not understand.76 Employers and landlords who rely
heavily on these services may not distinguish between an arrest that
is never pursued and an arrest that ends in conviction.77 While a
conviction may be expunged, an arrest that shows no final resolution remains in background checks and continues to plague job and
67

Chien, supra note 1, at 575.

68

Chien, supra note 1, at 574.

69

Chien, supra note 1, at 567.

70

Chien, supra note 1, at 567–69.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 569–70.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 580–83.
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The Internet Never Forgets, SCI. AM. (Aug. 18, 2008), https://www.scientifica
merican.com/article/the-internet-never-forgets/; May Crockett, The Internet (Never)
Forgets, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 151 (2016).
74
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housing applicants.78 Chien refers to this problem as “punishing innocence,” and notes that “[a]mong the over half a million charges
reviewed in [Chien’s] analysis of background checks . . . only about
40% included a definitive record of conviction.”79 Moreover, these
results are racially lopsided due to racial disparities in arrest rates.80
To rectify these problems, Chien looks in part to Europe’s “right to
be forgotten” and argues that laws are needed to facilitate updating
public databases and punish organizations that continue to publish
outdated information.81 She also recommends automatic expungement of arrests that do not result in conviction.82
III. CONCLUSION
Chien offers an important reminder that the administrative details
of legislation can make or break its success.83 Her work is also an
important reminder of the ways that criminal justice involvement,
even without conviction, can permanently change an individual’s life,
and that activists endeavoring to create exits from the collateral
consequences of conviction must not forget the collateral consequences of arrests.84 Her overview of the state of criminal justice
reform efforts is a useful and eye-opening addition to the literature,
and should be carefully considered by those seeking to change the
system.
78

Chien, supra note 1, at 582.
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Chien, supra note 1, at 581–82.
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implementation).
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